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The proliferation, globalization, and fragmentation of law in world politics
have fostered an attempt to re-integrate International Law (IL) and International
Relations (IR) scholarship, but so far the contribution of realist theory to this
interdisciplinary perspective has been meagre. Combining intellectual history,
the jurisprudence of IL and IR theory, this article provides an analysis of
John H. Herz’s classical realism and its perspective on international law.
In retrieving this vision, the article emphasizes the political and intellectual
context from which Herz’s realism developed: the study of public law in
Germany during the interwar period and in particular the contribution of
Hans Kelsen and the pure theory of law to the study of international law. Herz
was deeply inspired by Kelsen but he criticized the pure theory for ignoring the
sociological foundations of law. Following his emigration to the United States,
Herz embraced realism but without disregarding international law. Indeed, his
mature, globally oriented realism offers a balanced, fruitful perspective for
thinking about the relationship between politics and law that is deeply relevant
for contemporary theory: it challenges modern, law-blind variants of realism
and holds considerable potential for contributing to the approaches that have
most successfully studied the law–politics nexus.
Keywords: realism; IR theory; international law; John H. Herz;
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Since the end of the Cold War, the continued growth of interdependence
and the proliferation of institutions and law, soft and hard, have fostered
an interest in re-integrating International Law (IL) and International
Relations (IR) scholarship.1 So far, realism has had little to contribute to
this interdisciplinary development. Providing a historical analysis of the
1 See Slaughter et al. (1998), Goldstein et al. (2000), Simmons (2008), Garth (2008), Beck
(2009), and Snidal and Wendt (2009).
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classical realism of John H. Herz (1908–2005) and its perspective on
international law, I argue that this strand of realism holds considerable
potential for contributing to existing scholarship and for facilitating a
necessary broadening and revitalization of the realist perspective on
international politics.
The ongoing attempt to rejoin IL and IR is dominated by rationalism,
predominantly in the shape of neo-liberal institutionalism, and con-
structivism. A soft version of realism acknowledges that law can influence
politics among states by providing information and reducing transaction
costs but stresses how the production (and effectiveness) of law serves
the powerful (Krasner, 2002). On the whole, however, realism offers a
stylized position against which the relevance, growth, and nature of rules,
institutions, and compliance can be posited and studied. Apparently, there
are good historical reasons for this predicament. When IL and IR became
estranged at mid-century, a realist critique of international law that led to
a pessimistic, and occasionally dismissive, view of this body of law was
central. Subsequently and following the ascendancy of neorealism, the
realist critique of international law hardened. In its original and strongest
version, neorealism leaves ‘no room whatsoever for international law’;
law is regarded as an epiphenomenon concealing temporary cooperation
among power- or security-seeking states (Slaughter, 1993: 217; see also
Barker, 2004; Goldsmith and Posner, 2005; Armstrong et al., 2008; Cali,
2010). For realists, law is a function of power if it is not ignored outright.
Recent scholarship has, however, complicated our understanding of
realism. Anticipated by Ashley’s (1984) critique of neorealism, a growing
literature draws attention to classical realism, its origins, richness, and
continued relevance. The writings of Hans J. Morgenthau (1904–80),
arguably the most important realist thinker of the twentieth century, have
proved particularly fertile. With roots in interwar Germany, where the
study of law and politics was inseparable from the fate of the Weimar
Republic and the new international order established at Versailles in
1919, Morgenthau provided a perceptive analysis of politics, power, and
authority in the international realm. With this context in mind, scholars
have traced Morgenthau’s German legacy and pointed to its importance
for the nature of post-war American IR theory.2 Moreover, we now have a
detailed sketch of Morgenthau’s background as a student of law and its
significance for his post-war realism, which included a grave challenge to
the project of an effective and universal system of international law
2 For example, Barkawi (1998), Scheuerman (1999, 2009a), Frei (2001), Turner (2009),
and Guilthot (2010). On Jewish e´migre´s and the American study of politics more generally, see
Gunnell (1993) and Katznelson (2003).
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(Ju¨tersonke, 2006, 2008; Scheuerman, 2008, 2009b). For two reasons,
however, it is worth revisiting the analysis of international law provided
by another Jewish e´migre´ and classical realist, John H. Herz.
First, the attempt to re-integrate IL and IR should be informed by a
thorough understanding of the political and intellectual context within
which the initial separation of the two academic subjects took place.
Understanding Morgenthau’s role in this process is indispensable, but it
does not exhaust the realist critique of international law. Moreover, Herz
and Morgenthau make a fruitful contrast in attempts to grasp the central
insights and diversity of classical realism (Hacke and Puglierin, 2007;
Scheuerman, 2009c). For both, the status and effectiveness of international
law conceived as a legal system was a central preoccupation at an early
stage of their careers. In contrast to Morgenthau, however, Herz identified
more closely with Hans Kelsen’s (1881–1973) pure theory of law and the
notion of a universal legal order, and remnants of such differences can be
detected in the variants of realism they defended. In short, revisiting Herz’s
conception of international law is important for grasping the variety and
complexity of classical realism.
Second, it is particularly fitting to retrieve this complexity at a time
when contemporary realist approaches to international law appear unable
to fully appreciate or assess the importance of ongoing processes like the
legalization of politics and the fragmentation and globalization of law.
Herz’s post-war realism was based on the well-known concept of the
security dilemma: human social relations are characterized by fear and
uncertainty, which, particularly in the absence of central authority, tend
to be self-reinforcing, thereby hampering attempts to reform or improve
international politics (Herz, 1951; Booth and Wheeler, 2008). In several
respects, Herz went further than other realists, not least in his insistence
on the viability of a realism for liberal purposes and in his attempt to
develop a global realism of survival in the wake of the nuclear revolution.
Realist iconoclasm, outspoken identification with liberalism, and social
shyness probably conspired to keep Herz on the fringes of realism’s as
well as IR theory’s canon. Recent scholarship has established that neither
the quality nor the originality of his work is responsible for this legacy.
Despite mounting interest in Herz’s ideas, however, we still lack a detailed
picture of his early intellectual development, his perspective on interna-
tional law and their importance for his distinctive version of realism.3
3 For recent interest in Herz, see Stirk (2005), Hacke and Puglierin (2007), and the essays
collected in International Relations (2008). Apart from Herz’s autobiography (Herz, 1984a),
published in German, existing accounts offer a fairly general outline of Herz’s early work and
his relationship to Kelsen (So¨llner, 1988; Stirk, 2005: 288–293).
412 C A S P E R S Y LV E S T
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000242
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 15 Jan 2017 at 14:40:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
Against this background, the article pursues three related objectives.
First, it seeks to provide a better understanding of Herz’s realism and the
place of international law in this vision; second, it seeks to broaden and
deepen our understanding of the roots of classical realism in the German
study of politics and law during the interwar period, in particular the
role of Kelsen and the pure theory of law in debates about international
law; and finally, it seeks to elucidate some broader implications of this
analysis for contemporary theoretical developments, stressing particularly
the challenge Herz presents to contemporary realism and the potential
contribution of a richer realism to the predominantly rationalist and
constructivist study of the law–politics nexus.
The thrust of my argument is as follows. Herz’s realism provides a
fruitful starting point for thinking about the dynamics, limits, and
potential of law in dealing with international and global problems.
Understanding the attractions of this richer realism requires a sound grasp
of its origins and foundations. Already in the formative years of Herz’s
intellectual development, we find characteristic attempts to overcome the
stalemate of intellectual dualisms. The struggle that came to define Herz’s
intellectual project – the struggle between the real and the ideal, between
the particular and the universal, between power and progress – had deep
roots in his early work on jurisprudence, international law, and philoso-
phy. Unlike Morgenthau, Herz expressed sympathy with the liberal
cosmopolitan vision underlying the pure theory of law. Although he left
behind the language and some of the more magnanimous ideals of the
pure theory when coming to America, his sociologically based realism
made possible the continued pursuit of the liberal project – albeit in a
transfigured and less ambitious version. When coupled with his attempt to
conceive of a global realism, Herz developed a more modest and prag-
matic view of law and a ‘realist liberal institutionalism’ that appreciated
power political as well as functionalist dynamics. Recovering and devel-
oping this vision is important, I argue, for two reasons: it could contribute
to contemporary interdisciplinary scholarship on how and why law
matters in international politics and could help expand and rejuvenate a
realist research agenda, which has for too long paid insufficient attention
to international law.
The article is structured as follows. The next section offers a sketch of
the pure theory of law developed by Kelsen and the Vienna School and its
contribution to the study of public and international law in Germany
during the early twentieth century. The following three sections provide a
historical account of Herz’s early work on international law. In this
narrative, three themes figure prominently: Herz’s mounting critique of
the pure theory of law, attempts to salvage it by turning to the philosophy
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of Nicolai Hartmann, and his turn to a sociological theory of international
law following a study of national socialist conceptions of international law
and his emigration to America. A final, concluding section performs two
functions: it turns to the contrast with Morgenthau in order to flesh out the
role of law in Herz’s global, post-war realism, and it emphasizes the
importance of this vision for contemporary theory.
The German legal tradition and the pure theory of law
From the late nineteenth century to the 1920s, the German study of law
was dominated by a variety of legal positivisms that in determining the
validity of law variously stressed its derivation from facts, statutory law,
and sharp legal logic. Alongside the family feuds of positivism that
straddled the political spectrum, approaches based on natural law were
less popular. Already before the war, however, a rival school of legal
science – promising a new and properly scientific approach to the study of
law – was emerging from the writings of Hans Kelsen. In contrast to
existing approaches, Kelsen sought to make the study of law scientific by
closing off the possibility of basing law on subjective political views, facts
masquerading as political ideology or the moral metaphysics of natural
law. Most legal scholars, Kelsen argued, could not resist the temptation
to ask what provided the real, substantial foundation of law, and in
answering this question they, inadvertently or not, went beyond the
scientific study of the law, delving into the abyss of morality, ideology, and
politics (Stolleis, 2001, 2004; Paulson, 2005).
Based on neo-Kantian philosophy and epistemology, Kelsen’s rival
approach sought to overcome the dualism of positivism and natural law
in defining and studying law. It was the task of the philosopher of science
to discover (through a critique of existing epistemological and inter-
pretative perspectives) the principles that bestowed validity on research
within specific sciences. For example, mathematics made it possible to
create (erzeugen) a conceptual infrastructure through which the dis-
coveries of physics could be comprehended. Similarly, the principles that
bestowed validity on scientific discovery in other disciplines should be
identified. This neo-Kantian epistemology animated Kelsen’s quest for
scientific legal knowledge. Essentially, he fought a battle on two fronts.
Against fact-based positivism, he argued that law could not be based on
facts alone: law entirely dependent on enforcement had no ‘should
character’ or ‘oughtness’. Legal validity could not then be reduced to
efficiency. Nor could a legal science be based entirely on the model of
the natural sciences, because law was not to be thought of as a causal
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proposition: the violation of a law will not entail a given sanction; a norm
or a legal proposition (Rechtsatz) merely entails that a sanction should
result. Likewise, and against the natural law approach veering off in
the opposite direction: law was not law because it was morally right.
A morally objectionable law would still be law by virtue of carrying a
promise of sanctions. Therefore, a natural law rooted in morality could
very well exist, though not as law. In Kelsen’s approach, then, the concept
of the legal norm is the epistemological perspective (Deutungsschema)
that makes law scientifically intelligible. His ‘positivism’ is primarily
positivism qua denying any necessary connection between morality and
law (the separation thesis), but he rejects the view also associated with
positivism that law is fact-based (the facticity thesis). The latter position is
also, however, what introduces (or so many would argue) an element of
naturalism into Kelsen’s theory: though law is distinct from morality
(pace the morality thesis), it can be explicated without reference to facts
(the normativity thesis) (Paulson, 1998: xxx–xxxv).
Important consequences followed from this approach. Purging law of
ideology and mythology necessarily meant that the content of law could
vary substantially. Moreover, the systematic and scientific view of law
led to a controversial understanding of the state. Contrary to received
wisdom, Kelsen argued that it made little sense to distinguish between an
empirical, sociological, or historical state and a legal, normative state.
Social activity might be described by references to ‘the state’, but such
descriptions constantly invoked legal norms (e.g. concerning obligation).
The best scientific conception of the state was that of a normative order
or a juridical system. Norms and rules depended on a delegation of
competence from rules located in the higher echelons of the system’s
hierarchical structure. This thesis of the identity of the state and the legal
system (die Identita¨tsthese) was a trademark of the pure theory of law
(e.g. Kelsen, 1981a: 75–81; Kelsen, 1998a: 14–20).
Kelsen was the leading advocate of the ‘Vienna School’4 that also
counted Adolf J. Merkl (1890–1970), Alfred Verdross (1890–1980), and
Josef L. Kunz (1890–1970). As outlined in Hauptprobleme der Staats-
rechtslehre (1911), Kelsen’s theory was static and unable to account for
legislation. Merkl was central in developing the concept of the pyramid of
law (Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung), which introduced dynamism. The
pyramidical mental image of the law shifted attention to the production
of law and the force of existing law, which helped pure theorists distinguish
4 The school is not to be conflated with the contemporary Vienna circle that advanced
logical positivism.
Realism and international law 415
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000242
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 15 Jan 2017 at 14:40:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
their approach from the logical jurisprudence of concepts. Traditional
Begriffsjurisprudenz was essentially static in its adamant insistence that
the judge, armed solely with logic, was a neutral purveyor of the law.
Merkl and Kelsen (who in 1923 took over the concept of the pyramid)
argued that law could not merely be deduced from fundamental princi-
ples: a legal system consists of norms that can be traced back to a basic
norm. The Grundnorm is a hypothetical norm that the legal scientist can
only grasp by a combined process of induction and deduction. It is what
gives meaning to the legal system: law is delegated from the basic norm to
lower strata in the pyramid of law, strata that progressively apply, specify,
and create law (Kelsen, 1998a: 11–14).
The reception of the pure theory of law in the interwar period was
overwhelmingly hostile, which can partly be explained by its Austrian
origins, the ambitious all-out assault on existing jurisprudence, lingering
anti-Semitism, political differences, and Kelsen’s neo-Kantianism and
biting style. Yet the combination of Ideologiekritik and a serene relativism
that flew in the face of the politicized nature of interwar German theories
of law and state created particular animosity. The professedly scientific
approach to the study of law was perceived to be limited and empty,
relegating judgement of many fundamental ethico-political questions to
the consciousness of the individual. It was either a form of bloodless
scientific utopianism – ‘an exercise in logic but not in life’ (Lacey, 2004:
250) – or a political project in scientific robes. Kelsen did not refrain from
engaging in public debate, providing unflinching support for democracy,
though he respected the dividing line between law and politics and
accepted the fight for democracy as personal and political. To critics
concerned with the deeper roots of state, law, and nation, Kelsen’s rela-
tivism appeared decadent, weak, and misguided (Koskenniemi, 2001:
245–249; Stolleis, 2004: 156–160; Paulson, 2005).
The theory of international law put forward by pure theorists was also
controversial. The quest to purge the study of international law from
muddled thinking and ideology made it increasingly evident that the pure
theory was in itself an ideological strategy that left only one political
project feasible. Pure theorists set their sights on four major themes in the
study of international law – the dualism between national and interna-
tional law, traditional notions of legal personality, sources of international
law, and the limits of international justiciability – that through careful,
logical analysis would be revolutionized, paving the way for a novel
understanding of international law coalescing with a liberal cosmopolitan
project. Indeed, as von Bernstorff has persuasively argued, the pure theory
of international law was an attempt ‘to construct international law as an
autonomous medium without any predetermined content’, which served
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as ‘an instrument of international legal experiment, indeed as a truly
‘‘universal’’ law in the sense of (a) a cure-all for social conflict and (b) of
global validity’.5
The background against which this project was launched was a German
discourse of international law, in which moralism played a modest role.
During the second half of the nineteenth century, and accelerating after
the unification of Germany in 1871, the centre of gravity in public political
discourse moved towards state power and nationalism. The centrality of
the state and a concomitant focus on sovereignty and authority as master
concepts were strengthened by the intimacy between international legal
scholars and the state apparatus. At the same time, liberalism was weak.
In a country bent on achieving a more prominent place in the interna-
tional order, the peace movement struggled. As in other parts of Europe,
there was during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a
tendency to move away from natural law as the foundation of interna-
tional law and focus instead on custom and treaties, an important
development that should not, though, be exaggerated. The character of
German politics and the increasing volume of international rules gave rise
to the central question with which German theories of international law
grappled throughout this period: given the sovereignty and authority of
the modern state, how is the international legal order to be conceived, on
what foundation does such an order exist, and with what political and
legal consequences? Or more simply, how ‘to square the circle of state-
hood and an international legal order’ (Koskenniemi, 2001: 181)?
Simplifying somewhat, there were three different responses to this
conundrum:6 The predominant answer was subjectivist, essentially
reducing international law to a voluntary legal order. Drawing on
Hegelian notions of state and law and reflecting the intimacy between the
study of constitutional law and international law in Germany, this
position (defended most prominently by Adolf Lasson) emphasized state
will and power, acquired through the German people, in the production
of law (a¨usseres Staatsrecht) (Hegel, 1991: yy330–340). The second and
much less prominent answer, developed by C. Kaltenborn at mid-century,
was a mirror image of the first: envisioning a European community of
states, it stressed the objective, supranational character of international
law (Bernstorff, 2001: 13–18). The third position reacted against this
dichotomy and essentially attempted a synthesis that ended up rather
as an oscillation between thesis and anti-thesis and, in the end, tilted
5 Bernstorff (2001: 208). See also Stern (1936: 740), Jones (1935) and Kunz (1968).
6 On German IL during this period, see Bernstorff (2001: Ch. 1), Koskenniemi (2001:
Ch. 3), and Hueck (2004).
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towards subjectivism. Georg Jellinek’s ‘two-sided’ theory of the social and
the legal state sought the kernel of an objective international legal order in
the state’s self-imposed duty to honour international law (Selbstverp-
flichtung) and in the constraining nature of international politics (Kelly,
2003: 93–113). In a similar fashion, Heinrich Triepel’s dualism – the
notion that municipal and international law were essentially separate
systems – identified a rational, free will among states as the glue that
could hold together international law.
In Das Problem der Souvera¨nita¨t und die Theorie des Vo¨lkerrechts
(1920), Kelsen attempted to square the notorious circle. Continuing the
assault on rival approaches, the book logically developed the pure theory
through an examination of sovereignty and its implications for interna-
tional law (Kelsen, 1981b). The solution bore the trademarks of the pure
theory. While dualism was untenable, not least from the perspective of
scientific universalism, Kelsen found no scientific means by which to
choose between two competing monistic visions: that of the domestic
legal order, which makes state will the foundation of international law, or
that of a monistic international legal order, in which states and domestic
legal orders were among the most important (though not the only) sub-
jects (Kelsen, 1981b: 123, 150; see also Kelsen, 1998b). The contours of
this jurisprudential landscape are summed up in Table 1.
Deciding between the two monistic conceptions of (international) law
was, Kelsen argued, inescapably an ideological and political exercise. Far
from agnostic about this question, Kelsen’s solution resembled his defence
of democracy in the domestic context. A monism of state law harboured a
‘subjectivist tendency’ that led to a denial of (the force of) IL, a negation
of the idea of law, and an assertion of power politics. The political choice
was between untrammelled sovereignty, subjectivism, and imperialism
Table 1. The pure theory of law and the jurisprudence of international law
Positive law
Natural law I. Negation II. Dualism III. Monism
Jus naturæ, jus
rationis, jus divinum
Austin, Hegel,
Lasson
Triepel (a) Primacy of
constitutional
law
(b) Primacy of
international
law
Grotius, the
Salamanca school,
Kaltenborn
Jellinek Verdross, Kunz
(Kelsen)
*Adapted from Kunz (1924: 124).
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on the one hand and pacifism and the legal unity of humanity within
an inclusive and universalist conception of world community (civitas
maxima) on the other (Kelsen, 1981b: 317–319; Zolo, 1998). So although
Kelsen could not scientifically resolve this quandary, he made no secret of
his own preferences or of the considerable political struggle that lay ahead
if international law was to triumph: developing social consciousness
beyond and across states could lift international law out of its miserable
condition. While Kelsen’s argument against dualism found favour among
pure theorists, the positing of a political choice between two monisms
and its underlying relativism (die Wahlhypothese) was greeted with
scepticism. Kunz and Verdross tried to corroborate the hypothesis of the
primacy of international law by examining customary and positive law.7
Despite disagreements on the scientific foundation of monism, however,
the Vienna School shared a common cosmopolitan project (Kelsen, 1935,
1942; Bernstorff, 2001: part II).
Herz, the identity of states and the primacy of IL
With great enthusiasm, Hans Herz (who only changed his name to John
after crossing the Atlantic) had discovered Kelsen’s pure theory of law
while studying in Berlin in the late 1920s. When Kelsen moved to the
University of Cologne in 1930, Herz who grew up in nearby Du¨sseldorf
became his first doctoral student. The topic for Herz’s Inaugural-
Dissertation, the identity of the state in relation to international law, was
doubly compelling. First, the birth and death of states and the conditions
under which the state remains identical with itself had profound impli-
cations for the entire edifice of political and legal theory in Weimar
Germany, including conceptions of the state, revolution, and the rela-
tionship between state and international law. This was advantageous to a
prodigious young scholar keen to combine the study of international law
with jurisprudence and political theory.8
Second, the topic was attractive for someone wanting to defend mon-
ism and the primacy of international law. As a general rule, changes in the
territory of a state or revolutions within states do not have any effect on
7 See Verdross (1914, 1923), Kunz (1924), and the discussion in Starke (1998). Verdross
later left behind the pure theory for a neo-thomist naturalist vision (Simma, 1995).
8 Herz (1931). Kelsen commented upon drafts of the thesis in much detail, an uncommon
practice for supervisors at the time (Interview with John H. Herz, 19 September 1980, John M.
Spalek Collection, Tape 1). Herz was closely identified with Kelsen: a short version of the
dissertation was published in the leading journal of the Vienna School (Herz, 1935a), and two
early articles were later reprinted in Me´tall (1974). See also Kelsen’s reference for Herz, 9 July
1938 (Herz Papers, Box 34, Folder: ‘List of Publications, Testimonials and Similar Materials’).
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the continuity of the state and its obligations with respect to international
law. Herz surveyed the theory and practice of international law on this
issue, and found that only very few (including the French and Russian)
revolutions brought this convention into question. Turning to state law
and legal doctrine, Herz found no consistent line of argument. All
attempts to deal with the problem of the identity of states in international
law required a theory of the state, and in the analysis of rival theories,
Kelsen’s student was given ample opportunity to demonstrate the
impurity of these conceptions of law and state. Gierke’s organic theory of
the state, the Verbandstheorie of Jellinek, and neo-Hegelian theories of
the state, primarily represented by the writings of Carl Schmitt, were all
castigated for reducing the state to its real properties, thus failing to treat
the state scientifically. By theorizing the state as a legal system, the pure
theory of law offered a way forward.
In his attempt to make the problem of the identity of states intelligible,
Herz subscribed to further crucial elements of the pure theory of law,
including the general presumption of the continuity of the legal order,
except when actions or events involve a violation of the Grundnorm, the
notion of the pyramidical structure of law, the Kelsenite critique of
impossible dualism, and the presumption of a universal legal order. This
was par for the course for the Vienna School. Following Verdross and
Kunz, and pace Kelsen, Herz argued for the primacy of international law.
His reasoning was twofold. On the one hand, the primacy of IL could be
demonstrated through analysis of existing rules (Herz, 1935a: 263n.). On
the other hand, Herz argued that a revolution’s overthrow of the foun-
dation of a legal system (its authority, constitution, or basic norm) and its
simultaneous continuity as a subject of international law was only com-
prehensible from the perspective of the pure theory and the primacy,
despite its primitiveness, of international law: discontinuity could here be
accommodated by the force of a higher legal principle. Indeed, in a
somewhat convoluted fashion, Herz argued that the conundrum of the
identity of states was the decisive case for conceiving of a universal legal
order that accorded primacy to international law (Herz, 1931: 80, 83–84).
True to the spirit of Kelsen, this argument allowed Herz to speculate on
the future consolidation of international law from an evolutionary, gra-
dualist perspective. The fact that this primitive system of law delegated
enforcement to its subjects (legal orders placed lower in the pyramid of
law) was a fundamental weakness. However, the combined effect of a
universal legal order that could only be discontinued by a violation of its
basic norm – something which could only happen through great power
dictatorship or a world revolution – and the existence of the League of
Nations as the germs of a personality that could represent and personify
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this order, carried a promise in line with the liberal aspirations of Kelsen.
Already at this early stage, however, Herz was uncomfortable with Kelsen’s
excessive idealism. The key to this reservation was the relationship between
norm and facticity in the pure theory of law. For in using the problem of the
identity of states as a vehicle for demonstrating the primacy of international
law, Herz realized that this could only be done by referring to the state as a
legal as well as sociological fact (see also Jones, 1935: 14–16). A definition
of the state that went beyond the Identita¨tsthese was needed if the problem
of the identity of the state should be solved. In providing this theory, he
returned to the discarded distinction between the state as a legal concept
and the state as a sociological concept, which signified a community’s
interest in ordering social relations through law. The sociological state
(Staatsgemeinschaft) guaranteed the effectiveness of the legal state
(Rechtsordnung), while the latter was a personification of the former (Herz,
1931: 65–72). Thus, Herz’s vindication of the pure theory involved a
revival of the dualist understanding of the state that had long been a prime
target for Kelsen and his followers.
The tension between the normative and its reliance, however indirectly,
on practice left a crack in the pure theory of law, particularly in relation to
international law. Although sanctions need not materialize in case of
breaches of the law, Herz pointed to the shady territory between the
promise of sanctions and the amount of effectiveness, a sociological ele-
ment, on which the proper existence of law was also based. In combating
theories of the state that derived the validity of law from groups like classes
or the Volk, Kelsen was in danger of ignoring the sociological foundations
of the existence of the state and law altogether. In other words, he came
close to treating the sociological state as a product of the legal state. ‘It is
going too far to argue that only ‘‘the legal state’’ and not ‘‘the sociological
state’’ should be analysed in the study of law’.9 The relationship between
the legal and the sociological state referred to a deeper tension in the pure
theory of law between is and should (Sein and Sollen). Commenting on this
tension, Kunz argued in 1934 that although the pure theory accepted the
necessary relation between the normative juridical order and ‘the realizing
acts of factual happenings’, it did not ‘identify the spiritual existence of the
law with this relation between normative order and factual reality’. Those
acts that realized norms were the conditio sine qua non of the juridical
order, not its conditio per quam (Kunz, 1968: 72).
At times this was more than a tension. Kelsen came close to considering
effectiveness and facts irrelevant for the science of law, as long as the
9 Herz (1931: 71). Here and in what follows translations from the German are my own.
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system on the whole was efficacious (a rather opaque criterion; e.g.
Kelsen, 1981b: viii). Inspired by contemporary philosophy (more on
which below), Herz took on this problem by arguing that law was a
doubly rooted phenomenon. The legal norm is peculiar by being part of
the ‘sphere of the legal ought’ (or ‘idealistic real’, Spha¨re des idealen Seins)
that can be traced back to a hypothetical basic norm but, at the same
time, the effectiveness of norm, rooted in the sphere of real, is crucial for
its validity. Thus, the quality of law was one of ‘lesser’ ideality (‘minderer’
Idealita¨t) than, for example, the laws of nature, and that led him to put
more emphasis than his Doktorvater on the real, sociological roots of
legal norms and their validity (Herz, 1931: 68).
Herz was adamant that this attempt to steer a middle way between the
legal and the sociological state, between ‘idealist’ and ‘sociological’ the-
ories of law and state, did not jettison the fundamentals of the pure
theory. Distancing himself from conventional ‘two-sided’ theories of the
state, Herz reaffirmed the fundamental validity and universal insights of
the pure theory of law, arguing that ‘[t]he hypothetical basic norm is
despite its rootedness in a system of facticity still the necessary pinnacle
from which the legal order stemsy ’ (Herz, 1931: 72; Herz, 1935a: 259,
268). The seeds of doubt were sown, however. Although communicated
in a fairly deferential style, Herz had located a problem within the pure
theory that could perhaps be solved by returning to its philosophical
foundations. Meanwhile, the tension between the ideal and the real,
between norm and will, was to acquire both greater urgency and more
political relevance in the context of Nazi Germany’s bid for world
hegemony. It was a problem that inevitably transgressed the porous
border between law and politics – and Herz was to follow in its trail.
A rescue mission: Hartmann’s philosophy and the importance of
sociology
Having taken up a job in the German civil service after completing his
university education, as a Jew, Herz was dismissed within months of
Hitler coming to power in 1933. After deciding to pursue an academic
career, Herz ended up (on Kelsen’s suggestion) as a student at the Geneva
Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI). During the late 1930s,
he returned to both the empirical and theoretical implications of his
Inaugural-Dissertation. One important theme was the philosophical
foundations of the pure theory of law. Herz had grappled with questions
of truth and objectivity, and his position reflected what was essentially a
Weberian solution to these problems. On the one hand, he argued that
422 C A S P E R S Y LV E S T
use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000242
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. Open University Libraryy, on 15 Jan 2017 at 14:40:55, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
social facts are always produced from a particular perspective – they are
standortsgebunden. On the other hand, Herz refused to accept that this
existential condition compromised the scientific truths produced by the
pure theory of law. So while historical, political, and social context
influenced the perspective of the legal or social scientist, this influence was
not prima facie a proof against the objectivity of such observations (Herz,
1931: 92–93; Weber, 1949). The pure theory of law offered a scientific
analysis, a phenomenology of law not weighed down by factual or
historical concerns. It was perhaps paradoxical that having criticized the
pure theory of law for going too far in its rejection of the sociological
basis of legal norms, Herz turned to highly abstract philosophical con-
siderations in his attempt at a rescue mission. Yet Kelsen’s neo-Kantian
foundations were challenged not only by the rise of neo-Hegelianism in
social theory but also from within the more technical genres of philoso-
phy, where focus shifted from epistemological to ontological concerns.
Enter Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950).
Educated in St Petersburg and at the neo-Kantian fortress of Marburg,
Hartmann moved to the University of Cologne as professor of philosophy
in 1925. He stayed until 1931 – the year of Herz’s Inaugural-Dissertation –
before moving to Berlin. Hartmann was the stereotype of an otherworldly
philosopher: while country and continent descended into chaos, he was at
his desk deeply immersed in the attempt to reach a better understanding
of the world and the place of human beings within it. Beginning from our
everyday experience, Hartmann argued that we find an independent
reality. The epistemological lenses we employ to grasp reality can lead to
distortion, but epistemology nevertheless presupposes ontology. Thus,
Hartmann moved away from the cardinal neo-Kantian point that human
cognition generates (erzeugen) reality. Reality exists independently of
human cognition and there is, therefore, a need for a ‘metaphysical
epistemology’ to account for Hartmann’s enlarged reality. This project
began from phenomenological premises and ended in a natural realism
‘this side’ (or beyond) idealism and (metaphysical) realism. The result was
a new ontology, a wide-ranging theory of reality (das Seienden) that in
contrast to the phenomenological interest in representation of reality in the
consciousness of individuals sought to grasp the essence of reality in itself
and in its forms and structures (Werkmeister, 1990; Spiegelberg, 1994).
A significant feature of this system was a structured view of reality.
Proceeding from the premise that the stratification of Being was observable,
Hartmann identified four distinct levels – the material, the organic, the
mental, and the spiritual – in which each level contains a number of cate-
gories with complex interrelations. Hartmann conceived of these levels or
strata in a scheme, where the material stood at the bottom and the spiritual
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at the top, and where the higher strata are dependent on the lower: categories
from the lower strata would recur in the higher strata, but the reverse was
not the case. No stratum was more ‘real’, no stratum had priority, which in
turn coalesced with Hartmann’s quest to avoid the fallacies of both idealism
and materialism: the world is a stratified reality, where all levels matter; the
lower might be more solid, but the higher are more complicated.
To Hartmann, the dependency of the higher strata on the lower was
fundamental in the sense that the lower strata supported the higher strata,
while each higher stratum also had a measure of autonomy by virtue of
the novum that it added to the lower strata. Synthesising dependence and
autonomy, the organic supersedes the material, the mental supersedes the
organic, and the spiritual level of reality supersedes the mental, whereby
human existence reaches its completion (Werkmeister, 1990: Ch. 2,
157–158). The spiritual stratum was divided into three modes: the per-
sonal spirit, the objective spirit, and the objectified spirit. While the first
referred to the existence of phenomena like will and consciousness, the
second encompassed collective historical manifestations like culture,
ethics, law, and science. Both the personal and the objective spirit were
temporally bound. In contrast, the objectified spirit referred to the time-
less in history, a realm of ideas that nonetheless requires a medium, for
example, art, literature, or philosophy, to emerge ‘for us’ (ein Fu¨r-uns-Sein;
Hartmann, 1933: 364–365, 383–390; Werkmeister, 1990: 184–191).
Several factors explain why the liberally educated Herz was receptive to
this philosophy. It encapsulated his taste for abstract philosophy, while
combining it with music, art, and sociology. The spiritual stratum was the
most important factor for the study of human social life, including law and
politics, and the book Hartmann dedicated to its study, Das Problem des
Geistiges Seins (1933), was conceived during the period when Herz was
among the students at Hartmann’s lectures at Cologne (Hartmann, 1933:
Vorwort; Herz, 1984a: 101–103). This philosophy could be deployed to
clarify and potentially solve the underlying problems in Kelsen’s neo-Kantian
theory of law, an idea that already loomed large in the Inaugural-Dissertation.
Indeed, Herz later recalled how, during the preparation of the thesis, his
infatuation with Hartmann’s Schichtenlehre led him to ‘struggle a little’ with
Kelsen, ‘a 100% neo-Kantian, who insisted on the complete separation of the
normative sphereyand the actual or factual reality of social life’.10 Yet
Herz’s systematic attempts to amalgamate Kelsen and Hartmann’s projects
were only published during his Geneva years.11
10 Consequently, ‘I was never in his view a 100% memberyof the Vienna School’. Herz
interview (Spalek collection), Tape 1.
11 The key texts are Herz (1935b, 1937a) and Bristler (1938).
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Kelsen had clearly exposed the methodological syncretism of conven-
tional approaches. Distinguishing between what is, what ought to be, and
what the law stipulates should be, he had dismissed crypto-naturalist or
crypto-sociological approaches to the study of law. Yet, picking up his
earlier critique, Herz argued that the pure theory’s distinction between
‘the sphere of the legal ought’ (Spha¨re des idealen Seins) and ‘the spa-
tiotemporal sphere of is’ (Spha¨re des raumzeitlichen Seins) was too
absolute, which in turn contradicted the true insights of the pure theory
(Herz, 1935b: 283). Kelsen occasionally conceded that neo-Kantianism
entailed difficulties with respect to reality’s importance for the validity
of a (normative) legal system, but he tended to treat the two as polar
opposites. Perhaps, Herz asked rhetorically, the distinction was not as
clear-cut as Kelsen assumed.
Ever concerned with overcoming stultifying dualisms, Herz used
Hartmann’s ontology as a philosophical basis for the argument that law
has roots in both Sollen and Sein. Surely, the legal norm expressed a
measure of autonomy above and beyond the sphere of spatio-temporal
reality. Yet, translating the ontic dependency between strata of reality into
the study of law, Herz argued that the sociological dimension of law had
to be taken into account: the sphere of the legal ought was based on
(aufruhen) the sphere of the spatio-temporal. In contrast to laws of nat-
ure, man-made laws were more dependent on the lower levels for their
effectiveness, which directed attention to sociological concepts like
authority and the efficiency of norms, in particular in relation to funda-
mental questions concerning the constitution and delimitation of legal
systems. Such sociologically founded analyses were the precondition for
unfolding the ‘system-immanent logic’ of the pure theory of law (Herz,
1935b: 293, 294). It was this complex argument that Herz sought to
capture in the exceedingly abstract title ‘Das Recht im Stufenbau des
Seinsschichten’ (‘Law within the Stratified Totality of Existential Layers’).
Flashing out the implications of his philosophical critique, Herz
(1937a) identified ways in which reality encroached upon the legal norm.
Even concepts and categories within the pure theory of law, for example,
the authority of law or the category of the legal person, were partly based
on elements in the sphere of the spatio-temporal (realfaktische Momente),
which in turn undermined the strong distinction between the spheres
of reality and legal norms. At this stage, however, it was becoming
increasingly clear how the philosophical critique propelled Herz towards
a more wide-ranging critique of the pure theory of law: ‘Law and power
are not identical, but neither are they absolutely antithetical. Law cannot
exist without power, although it is not completely determined by the
categories of power’ (Herz, 1937a: 2–3). This was still a friendly critique
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from inside the camp of the pure theory, but in terms of the development
of Herz’s vision of international law and international politics, it was an
important step on the intellectual journey away from Kelsen.
Philosophical doubt conspired with the harsh political realities of the
1930s to pave the way for a more sociological conception of law that
found the exposure of ideology and politics in conceptions of the law
sound but, ultimately, insufficient. In the late 1930s, Herz began com-
menting from a more overtly political perspective on developments in the
practice of international law. He later described how his chief concern in
this type of work – published in Die Friedenswarte, edited by Hans
Wehberg – was ‘to fight for those ideals and procedures that might
strengthen the collective security system, and to indict the policies of
member states or organs of the League itself running counter to those
principles’.12 In this context, the notion of a universal legal order and
Kelsen’s value-relativism regarding the content of laws appeared
increasingly problematic (Herz, 1984a: 99–100). If further evidence was
needed, it was readily available in the material on which his Diploma was
based: national socialist conceptions of international law.
Leaving Europe, abandoning law?
The years Herz spent at Geneva from 1935 to 1938 were academically
successful and politically depressing. His main preoccupation during these
years was his Diploma thesis on national socialist doctrines of interna-
tional law. The study, published in Zu¨rich in 1938 under a pseudonym
(Eduard Bristler) in an attempt to protect the members of Herz’s family
remaining in Germany, reflected Herz’s suspension between the pure
theory of law and the search for more robust solutions in a fragile world.
Herz shared the liberal political ideals of the most prominent interna-
tional lawyers of the day. At HEI, he took courses with Wehberg, Hersch
Lauterpacht, and Kelsen. George Scelle, whose idiosyncratic legal uni-
versalism was grounded on the solidarity of humans (Thierry, 1990),
eventually wrote the foreword to Herz’s first book.13 Nevertheless, Herz’s
12 John H. Herz, ‘On Human Survival: How a World-View Emerged’, unpublished English
translation of Chs 1–7 of Herz’s autobiography, Herz Papers, Box 6, p. 124; Herz (1936,
1937b).
13 The German book was based on Herz’s English thesis, the first submitted at HEI. A copy
of the Diploma is in Herz papers, Box 6. Through Lauterpacht and Harold Laski, Herz
tried unsuccessfully to find a publisher for the thesis in England. See Lauterpacht to Herz,
2 May 1938 and Laski to Herz, 30 November 1938, Herz papers, Box 40, untitled folder. The
research led to two English publications (J. Herz, 1939; Florin and Herz, 1940). Contemporary
studies of the subject include Preuss (1935) and Gott (1938).
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vision and vocabulary underwent a profound change towards the end of
the 1930s.
In Die Vo¨lkerrechtslehre des Nationalsozialismus, Herz deployed
traditional Kelsenian weapons to expose the political and ideological
basis of recent national socialist scholarship and its enmeshment in a
larger political and propaganda project for clandestinely advancing
Hitler’s expansionist ambitions under the cloak of respect for interna-
tional law. The analysis was, according to Herz, scientific and not poli-
tical. Through objective exposition that formed the basis for immanent
critique, the ‘scientist’ could inch closer to the nature of international law,
while exposing the true (ideological) character of national socialist
scholarship. Since a detailed exposition and analysis has been provided by
Stirk (2008), I shall focus primarily on the role of the book in the
development of Herz’s perspective on international law.14
Two important distinctions informed the analysis. First, Herz dis-
tinguished between the foreign policy implications of national socialism
before and after 1933. The former was a logical extension of Hitler’s
Mein Kampf: it began from a racial definition of politics and defined
Germany’s objective as a fight for expansion and Lebensraum in a world
of untrammelled power relations. Before 1933, law and science were
clearly subordinated to the political objectives of the racially defined
Volk organized in the state. After coming to power, however, Hitler
stressed Germany’s peaceful intentions while insisting on its claim to
political equality, an objective that was to be achieved through revision
of the Versailles settlement. This new face of national socialism involved
a (temporary) reversal of its positions on a right to expansion and the
principle of non-intervention. Second, Herz distinguished between
national socialist scholarship on international law based (largely) on
notions of natural law, state rights, and the existence of an international
community, and scholarship based (largely) on notions of race or Volk-
stum. Political opportunism and a paradox inherent in the influential
national socialist jurisprudence of Helmut Nicolai (where an interna-
tional legal system was, at the same time, voluntarist, a source of state
rights and binding if based on race) helped explain this configuration
(Bristler, 1938: 71).
Either way, the result was a hollowing out of international law. The
‘natural law’ school consisted primarily of experienced legal scholars
trying to accommodate the new regime. They used state rights and the
14 Herz’s conclusions have been supported by later students of the subject: Vagts (1990:
661n.) terms Herz’s book ‘the most valuable work’ and Scheuerman (1999: 305n.) has
described it as ‘groundbreaking research’ and ‘a superb monograph’.
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principle of sovereign equality to argue against existing law, i.e. the
Versailles settlement. Although riddled by theoretical problems – includ-
ing an unclear concept of rights and a vague notion of international
community – this approach mapped on helpfully to the foreign policy
doctrines of Hitler during his first years in power. Herz concluded that the
groups’ real purpose was not to extend and embed an international com-
munity; rather, this was a mere fac¸ade behind which emerged a purely
individualistic conception of IL based on the freedom of states to deploy
violence (Bristler, 1938: 107–108). The race-based school was more
outspoken in its denial of any potential for supranational law. Its starting
point – a racial definition of the Volk and the insistence that no people
can act legally against its will – gave away its implication: a complete
‘minimalization’ of international law, a rejection of the League of Nations,
and a naked realism professing the naturalness of war and enmity between
peoples.15 This doctrine bolstered Hitler’s aggressive pre-1933 and post-
1936 foreign policy and combined effortlessly with prevalent national
socialist rhetoric by providing a romantic yet hollow prophecy of a racially
based European order.
Pointing to the stifling implications of censorship in Germany, the analysis
unveiled the logical contradictions and the opportunist, self-serving character
of national socialist scholarship.16 From the racist perspective of national
socialism, squaring the circle between statehood and international law was
particularly treacherous: it was simply impossible ‘to demonstrate how
international law, having its source in the legal consciousness of the single
races or peoples, can have an obligatory character’ (J. Herz, 1939: 545). Both
‘the natural law’ and ‘the race school’ were ambivalent, mixing utopian
aspirations with a project of minimization. As intellectual smokescreens for
Nazi foreign policy they sought, ultimately, the continuation of a system
based on power and interests. Despite internal differences, national socialist
doctrines of international law exemplified ‘the great extent to which science
[Wissenschaft] can be put in the service of external pursuits and interests’
(Bristler, 1938: 193).
The analysis reinforced Herz’s increasing discomfort with the pure theory
of law. Stressing that ‘[c]ognition is perspectivist [standortsgebunden] in
15 Herz associated Carl Schmitt with this position (Bristler, 1938: 147–149, 152–162,
169–170). Herz later wrote two shorter articles on the penetrating ideas and moral failures of
Schmitt (Herz, 1975; Herz, 1992). In an unpublished letter to the New York Times in 1988 on
Heidegger and Schmitt, Herz’s attitude was summed up in the dictum ‘as all too often: Great
thinkers, small characters’ (Herz papers, Box 3, Folder: ‘Unpublished letters to editors’).
16 Fittingly, the book was promptly forbidden by the Nazi regime after its appearance. See
the ‘Bekanntmachung’, 9 August 1938, reprinted in Europa¨ische Ideen (1978: 68).
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the widest sense of the termy ’, while maintaining that the object of
cognition was not, Herz argued that every perspective on international
law offered a degree of approximation to ‘truth’ (Bristler, 1938:
178–179). Hartmann and Kelsen’s aspirations on behalf of science and the
Enlightenment notion that the application of reason heralded a promise of
human emancipation loomed large. But because law, a human artefact,
was often studied in a way that serves political and ideological purposes,
legal scholars shaped the law in an indirect (and possibly unconscious)
fashion. These features were only exacerbated in the study of interna-
tional law due to the vaguer nature of the subject. Clearly subordinating
scientific results to political objectives, national socialist scholarship on
international law was a fitting if extreme example of this. Although
‘[t]heir real aims merge in the ideas and ideals of Mein Kampf ’,17 this did
not preclude the possibility that the perspective of national socialist
scholars contained some insight. Indeed, they had identified, though
disappointingly, never analysed or theorized dimensions of international
law that other scholars had not contemplated sufficiently.
Obviously, Herz had in mind the sociological, realfaktische foundation
of international law, the precondition of its effectiveness and growth.
What characterized real international law, how did it emerge, by what
elements of organization and compulsion was it supported, did it involve
a minimum of formal equality among its subjects, and how could it be
changed? These were some of the questions that national socialist scho-
lars, indirectly and in their idiosyncratic, bewildering ways, amplified.
Indeed, even if national socialist scholarship on international law
obscured theoretical insight, it ‘serve[d] a purpose in clarifying our per-
spective on law and its characteristics’ (Bristler, 1938: 216). Herz came to
the conclusion that there exists degrees of law depending on its real,
sociological foundations. This brought him ever closer to a showdown
with Kelsen. International law was not a complete legal system but a
patchwork of different laws (classical, customary, treaty, etc.) with
varying degrees of effectiveness, and it was doubtful that reprisals and
war constituted sanctions, as Kelsen argued. True international law would
emerge only when an adjustment of interest could be imposed and
guaranteed by a legal organization (c.f. Kelsen 1935: 12–17; Bristler,
1938: 200, 202). Racial ideologies, expansionist power states, and new
technologies of warfare made for an explosive and deeply troubling
condition. To continue the current arrangement of international law
17 J. Herz (1939: 554). Bolshevist theories were also ideological but in a more outspoken
fashion (Bristler, 1938: 207–213; Florin and Herz, 1940).
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based on power and vague rules ‘would not only perpetuate the inter-
national anarchy, but simultaneously involve a relapse into barbarism’
(Bristler, 1938: 215).
In this light, Kelsen’s insistence on the separation of legal and political
matters and on the perfect, hypostatized international legal order
appeared unattractive. The practical, political task of providing a socio-
logical foundation for the operation of law could not (merely) be a matter
of individual conscience. The late 1930s afforded no such luxury. Thus,
in the years bracketing his emigration to America, Herz relinquished
cardinal points of the pure theory of international law and turned towards
a sociological conception, which in turn eased the transition to his new
identity in the United States as a political scientist and foreshadowed
his political realism. Finalized at the Institute of Advanced Study at
Princeton University after his emigration to America in 1938, Herz’s ode
of farewell to the theory he had discovered in Berlin in the late 1920s was
the logical conclusion of the intellectual development he underwent at
Geneva (H. Herz, 1939). Apart from some remarks in Political Realism
and Political Idealism (1951) and a contribution to Kelsen’s Festschrift
(1964), reiterating and developing his original critique, Herz abandoned
the pure theory in favour of a series of critical observations about the
foundations, status, and strength of international law. International law
did indeed develop gradually, but it was closer to the patchwork of
authority and unregulated territory in a failed state than to Weber’s ideal-
typical state. Pace Kelsen, war could not be conceived as a sanction of a
legal system; apart from a few unrepresentative cases, this simply flew in
the face of facts (H. Herz, 1939). If anything, war was a way of chal-
lenging and changing the legal system.
The strength of the pure theory of law was its most debilitating
weakness: it began from an ideal-type that turned out to be deeply
inadequate, if not dangerous,18 because many accepted norms were not
delegated norms of competence but norms of expediency. In short, the
pure theory of law was itself ideological, reflecting a particular context
and serving certain political purposes. This understanding of ideology and
the unmasking of the self-interested character of thought have in IR
18 Herz would later argue (1964: 108–109, 114) that the approach of his former mentor
constituted a sort of Kantian conceptual overstretch, which invited hubris and lent itself to
abuse. His submission to the editor of Kelsen’s Festschrift was accompanied by the following
note: ‘Vo`ila`. After some 20 years’ absence from the battle-field of ‘Pure Theory of Law’ I got
excited about it againy I hope it’s not too criticaly there are a couple of admiring remarks
(not just for the effect, but meant so)’. Herz to Sa´lo Engel, 2 April 1963 (Herz Papers, Box 39,
Folder: ‘Correspondence 1959–63’).
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become associated with Karl Mannheim and E.H. Carr, and it is, argu-
ably, a distinguishing feature of classical realism (Jones, 1998: Ch. 6;
Oren, 2009). While the pure theory of law deployed similar strategies in
criticizing rival theories, it was unreflexive, harbouring a tendency to
rationalize facts from the perspective of a universal legal order. Kelsen’s
supposedly positivist theory of international law constituted ‘in a way, the
most sophisticated natural law theory which has been developed during
this century in the field of international affairs’.19
Herz now proposed to view international law formally as a legal system
with a complex of basic norms (based on customary and treaty law),
but practically as a patchy and partly contradictory legal order (H. Herz,
1939: 288). The incipient dualism between the legal and the normative
conception of the state had developed into a distinction between ideal and
real international law. In effect, this was a concession to ‘realists’ who
poked fun at the legal scholar by pointing to the part of interstate rela-
tions based purely on power and interest. Although Herz continued to
focus on (and teach) international law as a way of making his way into
American academia, his writings reflected the turn to social science and an
unabashedly sociological approach to international law as nothing but ‘a
barely veiled legal and ideological superstructure upon the relationships
of power’.20 The aim of social science was to supply an adequate
description of reality, not fulfil dreams of clarity and scientific ordering.
On the face of it, this hard-nosed perspective on international law left
little room for a liberal project. Yet Herz continued to insist on the
existence of rules and norms, particularly in less politicized realms, and a
precarious historical trend towards legal progress in international politics.
The social scientist had to avoid denying or overrating the effect of
international law. International law existed but so did very real impedi-
ments to developing the international legal order beyond the technical or
the trivial. This was reflected in a much muddier situation, in which the
dual role of diplomacy was ‘to try to settle issues in reference to general
normsy [and] to deal with them by political negotiation’. It was an
attempt at coordination between a teleological postulate of the unity of
legal systems and the political character of the international legal system
19 Herz (1964: 108). See also Herz (1951: 96–99, 101–102), which contains interesting
parallels to Bull’s (1986) critique of Kelsen. It is not without irony that it was Kelsen who on
Herz’s behalf accepted the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award that this book received at the
American Political Science Association’s meeting in California in 1951 (see Herz Papers, Box
38, Folder: ‘Book reviews and Correspondence on Political Realism and Political Idealism’).
20 Herz (1941: 63). This view has distinct similarities with that of other classical realists like
Morgenthau (1940) and Carr (1946: Ch. 10).
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symbolized in the shifting operation of the balance of power (Herz, 1964:
112–113). The inescapable conclusion was that the international legal
order was both extremely complex and extremely precarious, forever
threatening to self-destruct (H. Herz, 1939: 289–290, 298–300; Stirk,
2005). Here lay the kernel of Herz’s later vision of international politics
and its attempt to harness the insights of realism for the realization of
essentially liberal values. His wartime writings exuded a modest liberal
strategy of searching for compromises, for example, in relation to detailed
rules of international law or with respect to an improved system of
collective security (as against more wide-reaching proposals for world
government; Herz, 1941, 1942). This liberal, reformist sentiment was
also, of course, a trademark of Herz’s most important post-war books
(Herz, 1951, 1959). Thus, Herz’s realism project was never limited to
appreciating the implications of sociological dynamics like the security
dilemma in changing contexts. With the development of his global realism
from the late 1950s onwards, the broader liberal and universalist ambi-
tions reasserted themselves. And in this vision, law and institutions came
to play a transfigured and more modest, yet still important, role.
Reflections on realism and international law
To grasp the nature of Herz’s realism, it is appropriate to contrast it
with Morgenthau’s version. As apostles of realism, the two were clearly
in sympathy. Despite being in Geneva at the same time, they only met
in America; they became friends, albeit never close. Morgenthau was
instrumental in having Herz’s first English book published, resubmitting
it to Chicago University Press in 1950 after an initial rejection.21 For
his part, Herz admired Morgenthau’s intellect and respected him as the
leading American post-war realist, not least for insisting on the ethical
dimension of political life and for his critique of American foreign policy
during the Vietnam era. On the other hand, Herz was critical of several
aspects of Morgenthau’s realism, including its basis in stifling assumptions
about human nature22 and of the vagueness that surrounded the core
concept of the national interest. The latter made Morgenthau prone to
misinterpretation, but it was the former that, according to Herz, locked
his fellow realist into a tragic stalemate. Morgenthau was resigned to the
21 Herz Papers, Box 40, Folder: ‘Correspondence 1948–52’.
22 See, for example, Herz (1951: 3, 63–64, 233) and Herz (1984a: 159, 161). This view was
shared by Waltz (1959: Ch. 2), and runs parallel to a contemporary argument that Morgenthau
took the sting out of his realism by basing it on rigid philosophical assumptions (Scheuerman,
2009b).
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necessity and impossibility of world government in Politics Among Nations,
and his lack of a truly global vision (extending beyond the challenge of
nuclear weapons) and the theoretical means of conceiving it were connected
to this posture. At a symposium entitled ‘Revisiting Realism’ in the early
1980s, Morgenthau wryly remarked ‘why revisit; I never left it’. To Herz, the
sentiment behind this statement said much about Morgenthau’s conviction
but also about the limitations of his realism.23
During the 1920s and 1930s, Morgenthau had also been deeply
enmeshed in the German study of law and politics, taking a particular
interest in the work of Hugo Sinzheimer, Lauterpacht, and Kelsen.
Inspired by Kelsen, Morgenthau viewed international law as a system of
legal norms, albeit primitive and decentralized. But the strength and
efficiency of this body of law was based, according to Morgenthau, on the
operation of the balance of power (Morgenthau, 1940). This was a more
downbeat view of the prospects of international law than that of the
leading legal scholars, and it remained central to his realist vision of
international politics. For example, Morgenthau reacted to the notion,
advanced above all by Lauterpacht, that justiciability was virtually
unlimited in international relations. Although international law was
important and often observed, legal dispute settlement mechanisms
ignored political tensions among states. For Morgenthau, the importance
of the balance of power and the distinct nature of the political invariably
placed severe limits on the role of law in international politics.
For both Morgenthau and Herz, the turn away from international law
signified an intellectual shattering of illusions that mirrored Europe’s
protracted and predestined descent into war. Though the sphere of
international politics had revealed itself inhospitable to the rationalist
underpinnings of traditional liberalism, neither lost sight of liberal values
like progress, order, and liberty. Their strategies and visions differed,
however. Morgenthau clearly had liberal-left sympathies during the
interwar years and his realism did intermittently move in universalist
directions during the Cold War – partly, perhaps, inspired by Herz
(Scheuerman, 2009a: 138). Yet his realism was more ingrained and more
resistant to both change and the pursuit of liberal ideals than that of
Herz. The latter continued to emphasize that the security dilemma was a
social condition, which could be manipulated, mitigated, and (possibly)
transcended. This understanding of international politics was strengthened
23 On Herz’s assessment of Morgenthau, see Herz (1984b, 1981) and his address entitled
‘Hans Morgenthau’s Classical Realism in an Age of Endangered Human Survival’, delivered at
a symposium on realism in Munich, November 1989 (Herz Papers, Box 17, Folder: ‘Text of
and Material on Munich Lecture’).
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by Herz’s ground-breaking analysis of the atomic age and its con-
sequences for statehood, which in turn led him to focus on a number of
related global threats such as resource depletion, the population explo-
sion, and ecological deprivation (Herz, 1959). He anticipated the charge
that this call for ‘universalism’ amounted to a betrayal of realism
by arguing (somewhat implausibly perhaps) that ‘the jolt that drove
me out of my European environment healed me forever of utopianism’
(Herz, 1976: 52). Yet Herz’s realism became global in orientation;
it relentlessly stressed the threat to human survival presented by an
interdependent, hyper-technological, nuclear-armed, poverty-ridden, and
wasteful world. The condition of globality (Herz, 1959: 319) was only
made more dangerous by existing state-wedded concepts and ideologies.
For Herz, then, examining realism in light of a rapidly changing world
became a central preoccupation.
The sources of these differences, I would suggest, are to be found in
Herz and Morgenthau’s early theoretical and political orientations and
the lessons they took from the failure of liberal-democratic experiments
during the interwar years. A residue of their pre-war political and intel-
lectual convictions followed them across the Atlantic. Of fundamental
importance in this respect was Herz’s early admiration for Kelsen and his
close association with the scientific and political project of the Vienna
School. Although Ju¨tersonke (2008: 109) has suggested that Morgenthau’s
formulations on the necessity and unattainability of a world state were
informed by this ‘cosmopolitan project’, such a reading perhaps under-
estimates the severity of Morgenthau’s critique of liberal projects of
international law throughout the 1930s and 1940s as well as the extent to
which he bought into counter-enlightenment thought (Scheuerman,
2009b: 45–49). What Morgenthau admired in Kelsen (after all, he dedi-
cated a volume of his essays to Kelsen) was the scientific analysis of law.
He was less wedded to the liberal political project associated with the
pure theory of law, and he certainly turned more decisively away from it
in his immediate post-war writings than Herz. Only after the nuclear
revolution did Morgenthau turn to more universalist aspirations that sat
uneasily with his rather nation-bound realism. And yet, he found some
solace in a tragic realism tied to national communities, which in turn
reduced a liberal project to a few fundamental values and the protection
offered by a realist foreign policy conducted by the wise statesman.
Morgenthau (1978: 71) was sceptical about Herz’s project precisely
because he doubted whether ‘it is really enough to accept both the uni-
versality of power as an empirical fact and the concern for the individual
and its free development as an ideal postulate’. For Herz, realism had
clearly become indispensable, but the questions were too pressing and his
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orientation too liberal for him ever to feel comfortable with the element of
resignation that most realisms involve. Indeed, realism could be nothing
but ‘Realist Liberalism’ (Herz, 1951).
Crucially, in formulating what realist liberalism implied in an age
of globality, Herz accorded international law a role that, though it
avoided the high-minded aspirations of the pure theory of law, was not
merely ‘residual’ (Koskenniemi 2001: 472). A precondition for this
revised conception of international law was a strong interest in the actual
development and continued challenges of international law. Herz strongly
resisted the erosion of fundamental principles of international law and
took part in campaigns for reforming the United Nations and upholding
human rights.24 His post-war view of international law clearly proceeded
from the double understanding that law reflects rather than regulates
(power) politics and that experience rather than logic determines law. Yet
it also modified this sociological approach in several ways.25
First and most importantly, from the late 1950s, Herz continuously
stressed how a deeply necessary change in the direction of stronger and
more comprehensive rule-making to manage global survival problems
was preconditioned on a ‘change in perceptions’. International law was
based on power, but the interests of (powerful) actors could change with
perceptions. Indeed, Herz’s universalism was based on a ‘solid, cool-
headed realism’ that acknowledged how in a context of globality the
distinction between national interest and internationalist ideals was,
strictly speaking, invalid. They could be seen to merge in a common
interest in survival, but this required changing perceptions and developing
‘a ‘‘planetary mind’’’ (Herz, 1959: 310, 317). So while Herz often argued
that law was deeply necessary, without a change in beliefs and attitudes,
international law would continue to be stymied in a world of sovereign
states. Fittingly, in one of the last sentences he wrote, Herz emphasized
24 Herz’s papers include a huge amount of newspaper clippings and other material on the
development of international law. His support for fundamental principles of international law
is evidenced, for example, in letters to the New York Times, 24 November 1983 and 18 May
1984. Moreover, Herz was involved in The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
from 1960 to the mid-1970s. Having signed every report of the commission during the 1960s,
he complained in 1973 that he had, ‘frankly, become a bit discouraged by the timidity of the
Commission in regard to any somewhat bolder, ‘‘internationalist’’, approach’. Herz to Richard
N. Swift, 26 April 1973 (Herz Papers, Box 5, Folder: ‘CSOP Project’). During the late 1970s
and early 1980s, Herz was solicited by Amnesty International to write a series of letters to
heads of state, including Tito, Saddam Hussein, and Erich Honecker, regarding the dis-
appearance or arrest of high-ranking officials (Herz Papers, Box 10, Folder: ‘Amnesty Inter-
national, 1977–80’).
25 There are other sociological approaches to international law than the one associated with
realism. For an overview, see Carty (2008).
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how ‘[a] radical turn in attitudes and policies is required’.26 Second,
Herz’s mature approach to international law was formulated within a
larger vision of realist liberalism that shared important traits with legal
pragmatism, an approach that combines ‘idealistic ends with realistic
means’ and understands law as ‘a context-related creative act of problem-
solving’ directed towards urgent problems (Schieder, 2009: 139, 125).
There were important overlaps between Herz and the New Haven School
associated with Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal. Both stressed
effectiveness as central to law, both viewed law in a larger social and
political context, both stressed a global perspective, and both advocated
an action-oriented theory that did not exclude a relation to values and
normative principles.
Finally, Herz appreciated the role of institutions in world politics. The
functioning of international law in the modern period was based on the
‘deep’ institution of territoriality. Globality challenged the territorial
principle and gave rise to a difficult transitional period for international
law. As the global crises of population, ecological deprivation, and
nuclear weapons deepened, Herz came to stress the need for ‘vastly
increased international cooperation, overall global planning, and the
development of new procedures of institutional rule-making in place of
leisurely diplomacy and old-fashioned, complex, and slow treaty-making’
(Carter and Herz, 1973: 258). Despite acknowledging the sporadic support
of states and the problems of democracy and legitimacy involved in this
transformation, Herz placed much emphasis on the role of institutions
and organizations. Like Morgenthau, he accepted the integrative logic in
David Mitrany’s functionalist theory of international politics, although he
was adamant that functionalism did not render power politics obsolete.
The mainspring of functionalism was janus-faced: interdependence fostered
international cooperation but also attempts to reassert national power
(Herz, 1959: 327–328; Scheuerman 2009a: 129–134). Europe was
obviously an important and successful example of the functionalist logic,
but the rapid development of UN institutions and agencies directed at
solving technical and economic activities should not be underestimated.
The result was a bottom-up view of international law that emphasized
gradual development based on the existing infrastructure of international
politics. This was a sort of ‘realist liberal institutionalism’ that while
stressing the ever-present importance of power in determining law also
26 Herz (2003: 416). Herz developed the theoretical basis of this emphasis on perception in
‘World-views and awareness – prolegomena to a science of international relations’, unpub-
lished paper, undated (1978; Herz Papers, Box 14, material outside folder). A German version
was later published (Herz, 1980).
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reserved a role for other factors, including mutual understanding achieved
through technical cooperation and the pure pressure of globality and
interdependence. While the latter made it inevitable to gradually cede
jurisdiction to supranational agencies dealing with global problems and
made a change in beliefs ever more acute, the former could potentially lead
to substantial cooperation in more contentious areas. Working from the
ground up in a politically divided world meant respecting the vital role of
diplomacy, despite its timidity. Embedding diplomacy in institutions could
lead to improved stability through better communication, understanding,
and mediation. It could also foster the development of procedures for
applying and specifying rules. Thus, Herz had a deep appreciation for
the role of rules, institutions, and organizations in fostering cooperation
in world politics (Herz, 1959: 291–294, 320, 342; Herz, 1964: 117; Herz,
1982: 174–175, 190n.). Although law needed power for its existence,
as Herz had argued in the late 1930s, power did not completely determine
law. In particular, the attempt to develop a global realism – shifting
realism’s concern with survival from a sole concern with the political
authority of the state to the planet and humanity – forced Herz to rethink
(again) the development and role of international law in managing
emerging global problems.
This vision, I submit, is still relevant and although it hardly constitutes
a ready-to-use theory of international law, it clearly speaks to the ongoing
attempt to understand and explain the nexus between law and politics in
the international realm. In IR theory as well as in the more specialized
study of rules and institutions, there are now calls for ‘eclectic theorizing’
(Katzenstein and Sil, 2008) and ‘a richer institutionalism’ (Abbott, 2005).
Greater integration between IL and IR scholarship is warranted due to
the importance, reach, irregularity, and complexity of modern interna-
tional law. While the quest for interdisciplinarity has so far been domi-
nated by liberal rationalist and constructivist approaches, the realist
position developed here complements and goes beyond these approaches
in its ability to analyse the functions, limits, and potential of law in an
interdependent yet politically divided world.
Rationalists, predominantly neoliberal institutionalists, have con-
siderably improved our understanding of why states cooperate, why rules
vary in terms of precision, obligation, and delegation, and how different
institutions are rationally (to be) designed. Yet this approach has also
been faulted for its conservative implications, its state-centrism, its
impoverished conception of politics, and its exclusion of normativity (e.g.
Reus-Smit, 2001, 2004). Not all neoliberal institutionalists are equally
vulnerable to this criticism, however. Paying attention to power differential
dynamics, non-state actors, the role of uncertainty and perception, and the
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potential for learning, some contributions to the study of legalization have
pointed to ‘the subtle strength of soft law over time’ as well as to the
usefulness and challenges associated with this type of law (Abbott and
Snidal, 2000: 447; Goldstein and Martin, 2000). Similarly, a recent
attempt to deploy rational choice theory to explain why states choose
(instrumentally) to comply with international law despite the absence
of institutionalized coercion emphasizes the role of reputation in repeated
interaction between states.27 Although the rationalist approach, com-
mitted to simplification and generalization, effectively specifies the logic
of arguments about the role of law in international politics, one can still
question whether its concept of politics and its underlying philosophy of
science enable a full appreciation of sociological and power-political
dynamics. Yet it is clear that there are overlaps with classical realist
concerns and a potential for mutual enrichment of these theoretical
perspectives.
Constructivists provide powerful explanations of the central role of
identities and perceptions in interest formation and their impact on the
quality of the environment in which world politics takes place. Such
analyses have pointed to the ways in which ideas and law constrain
politics (e.g. Finnemore, 2006). Constructivism has, however, been
criticized for leaving unspecified its conception of politics and for
failing to make clear what is distinctive about legal dynamics. As
Michael Byers has remarked, ‘when dealing with international law, the
constructivist ambit requires broadening, deepening, and a degree of
disillusioning’ (Reus-Smit, 2004: 23–24; Byers, 2008: 624). Given this
predicament, a normative, global realism that never loses sight of the
security dilemma has much to contribute. The proto-constructivist
dimensions of realist thought make it both feasible and fruitful to extend
the ongoing rapprochement of realism and constructivism to the study
of international law (Sylvest, 2008; Barkin, 2010).
In sum, the realist tradition harbours insights that are clearly relevant
for the attempt to rejoin IR and IL scholarship. A reformulated realism
that avoids state-centrism, appreciates functionalist dynamics, and shares
traits with legal pragmatism’s approach to law can offer a deep under-
standing of the demand for reliable international rules in particular issue-
areas and of the political interests and conflicts involved in the production,
implementation, and enforcement of these rules. Going well beyond the
strategic interaction of states, the realist conception of politics is not only
27 See Guzman (2008) and the recent symposium on Guzman’s book in this journal
(Brewster, 2009; Guzman, 2009a, b; Kydd 2009; Thompson 2009).
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centrally concerned with power relations but also deeply sensitive to the
normative aspects of international politics. Finally, with its traditional
emphasis on the importance of reflexivity, responsibility, and prudence in
political action, realism is well equipped to analyse the role of various
forms of international law in achieving mutual understanding and
building legitimacy while leaving room for politics and diplomacy.
The call for a re-engagement with international law presents a grave
challenge for contemporary realists who are reluctant to seriously discuss
a qualitative transformation of international politics, not to mention
major international reform. This position is both morally complacent and
institutionally conservative, and it bears little resemblance to the vision of
classical realists (Scheuerman, 2009a: 6). While most modern-day realists
pay scant attention to law, Goldsmith and Posner (2005) have recently
provided a realist critique of international law. Their argument is based
on the rationalist assumptions that states are unitary actors and that state
interests can be identified independently of the context in which they are
formulated. From this perspective, ‘international law emerges from states
acting rationally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of the
interests of others states and the distribution of power’ (Goldsmith and
Posner, 2005: 3). The ideological force of this argument is that interna-
tional law is denied any independent influence on states, which in turn
plays into a revisionist movement in the United States that defends a
monism of state law where international obligations are voluntary.28
Goldsmith and Posner are right to stress the role of state interest and
power. But because they posit a stark dichotomy between international
law as a check on state interest and international law as a product of state
power and interests, the conclusion is foregone: since it is not always the
former, it must be exclusively the latter.
But realism need not issue in legal nihilism. Instead of returning us to
the debates of 70 years ago, realism should engage the real processes of
legalization and fragmentation that have taken place in the meantime.
The realist liberal institutionalism of Herz, I have argued, provides a
valuable starting point. Consistently seeking to venture beyond defeatism
and to overcome stultifying intellectual dichotomies, Herz stressed that
confronting the problems of a nuclear-armed, overpopulated, poverty-
ridden, and ecologically unbalanced world would necessarily involve legal
and institutional reform. Forever flavoured by the political context of
interwar Germany and the liberal, universalist project associated with
28 See also Posner (2009). For critiques, see Berman (2006) and Hathaway and Lavinbuk
(2006).
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the pure theory of law, his mature and original realism was more modest,
yet in some ways also more far-reaching. It left room for appreciating
important empirical developments in the relationship between interna-
tional law and international politics, including legalization and globali-
zation, while keeping in mind the complexity and difficulties of such
processes in a world in which substantial political conflict among states
prevents easy solutions to what are incontrovertibly global problems.
From a virtually law-blind perspective, contemporary (neo)realism has,
alas, little to contribute to such debates. Indeed, it appears as little more
than the pure theory of law stood on its head. The challenge for realists is
then to rediscover and develop an understanding of global politics, in
which power and law, their interplay and respective limitations, find a
place. Although it might discomfort purists who fear the transgression of
conventional theoretical borders, this rethinking is important for under-
standing the world in which we live and for the continued relevance of a
realism connected to reality.
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